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NOTES AND COMMENT
Judiciary Committee and a sub-Committee appointed to consider it.
The latter group suggested a substitute bill to the Committee and
procured its publication with a view to attracting general attention.
While the bill did not reach the floor of the Senate, it is not to be
inferred from this that no progress was made.
The introduction of such a measure suggests the question of the
attitude of the Court. Less than eight years ago, the Arizona
statute considered in the Truax case was deemed to sanction a definite
wrong in depriving an employer of "all real remedy" against a. . . . . 1 , 219
"wrongful and highly injurious invasion of property rights. In
the Court's preliminary statement of the results of the ex-employees'
picketing, could be read the decision. The whole tenor of the major-
ity opinion was one of righteous indignation; in fact, as Justice
Holmes pointed out, it was not even inquired whether the business
affected had not been established subsequent to the enactment of the
statute. From such decisions, "it is an easy step," as Laski phrases
it, to the conclusion that the Court "is, in entire good faith, the un-
conscious servant of a single class in the community." Yet, as he
reminds us, "more harm has been done in legal history by the preju-
dices of sincerity than was ever achieved by the receptivity of
scepticism." 20
V. J. K.
RES IPsA LoQUITOR.*-The rapid growth of industry, with its
consequent increase in the use of powerful machinery has given rise
to a perplexing and vexatious problem. The question has come to
be increasingly common whether the fact of an injury occasioned by
the use of such machinery is to be regarded as raising a presumption
of negligence upon the part of the owner of the apparatus. "Res
ipsa loquitur is the phrase appealed to as symbolizing the argument
for such a presumption." '
of any such dispute, from assembling peaceably to act in the interests of any such
dispute, from agreeing with others to do or not to do any of the above specified
acts, and from inducing without fraud or violence any of those acts. Further,
no injunction might be granted in a labor case except after the taking of testi-
mony in open court and the Court's finding specifically a number of enumerated
facts. An exception would permit the issuance of a temporary injunction good
for five days only, without notice, where a complainant pleads an irreparable
injury and files a bond sufficient to compensate for the improvident issuance of
such injunction.
-257 U. S. 312, 328.
'o Supra Note 1 at 848.
* "The transaction speaks for itself," 3 Bouvier's Law Dictionary 2908.
'5 AWigmore, Evidence (1923), Sec. 2509.
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This doctrine is predicated upon the theory that "when a thing
which causes injury, without fault of the person injured, is shown to
be under the exclusive control of defendant, and the injury is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not occur if the one having
such control uses proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation, that the injury arose from defendant's
want of care." 2
It first found expression in the opinion of a famous English
jurist 3 and soon came to be known and accepted as a rule, adopted
generally,4 and existing today throughout the United States and
Canada.5
But whether the rule establishes a full presumption or merely
satisfies plaintiff's duty of producing evidence sufficient to go to the
jury is not always made clear.6 Decisions of the various states
present a situation beset with so many variations that a different rule
would seem to prevail in each jurisdiction.7 Nor is the confusion
due solely to a difference between jurisdictions for uncertainty exists
'even within states. This is so in New York.8
,Here it is difficult to determine just what degree of benefit, if
any, a plaintiff derives from reliance upon the doctrine of res ispa
loquitor. Nearly all the cases start out with a statement that the
accident creates a presumption but this is subsequently qualified by
language which generally diminishes and sometimes completely nulli-
fies the force of the first recital. Some well-considered opinions hold
that from a showing of the circumstances attendant upon the injury
the jury might presume negligence; 9 others that a presumption ac-
tually exists and that defendant is called upon to explain. 10 Still a third
class indicates that he must show due care."
2 San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 224 U. S. 89, 98, 32 Sup. Ct.
399 (1912). (Italics ours.)
3 Pollock, C. B., in Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Engl. Repr. 299
(1863).
'Only two cases on the subject in North Dakota: Wyldes v. Patterson, 31
N. D. 283, 153 N. W. 630 (1815) ; Leiferman v. White, 40 N. D. 150, 168 N.
W. 569 (1918).
65 Wigmore, op. cit. supra Note 1, Sec. 2509 N. 1; Heckel & Harper,
Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928) 22 Ill. Law Rev. 724.
0 Ibid.
Heckel & Harper, op. cit. stipra Note 5 at 726.
' Ibid. 734.
'Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901); Goll v. Man-
hattan Ry. Co., 5 N.' Y. Supp. 185 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. C., General Term 1889),
aff'd 125 N. Y. 714, 26 N. E. 756 (1891).
" Brooks v. Kings County Elevated R. R. Co., 23 N. Y. Supp. 1031 (City
Ct. Brooklyn, General Term 1893), aff'd 144 N. Y. 647, 39 N. E. 494 (1894);
Volkmar v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 34 N. Y. 418, 31 N. E. 870 (1892).
' Schmidt v. Stein, 119 Misc. 529, 196 N. Y. Supp. 727 (1922) ; Lynch v.
Ley, 119 Misc. 681, 197 N. Y. Supp. 360 (1922); Levine v. Brooklyn C. & S.
R. Co., 119 N. Y. Supp. 315, 134 App. Div. 606 (2nd Dept. 1909).
NOTES AND COMMENT
Griffen v. Manice, 12 a case frequently cited with approval is
illustrative of the first type. Plaintiff's intestate was in defendant's
building upon the latter's implied invitation. After a visit to one of
the upper stories and while returning to the ground floor in an
elevator, the elevator descended with such speed as to cause it to
strike the bumpers below the street level. Immediately thereafter the
counterbalance weights crashed through the roof of the elevator
striking him and causing his death. Upon the trial, the judge
charged: 13
"** * if you find in this case that this accident was one
which, in the ordinary course of business would not have hap-
pened if the required degree of care was observed, you have
a right to presume that such care was wanting."
The facts as outlined were cogent evidence of negligence yet the
court advised the jury that they were permitted to, not that they must
presume a lack of care. Defendant's appeal upon the ground of
alleged error in this charge was denied, though allowed for another
reason.
In Loudoun v. Eighth Ave. R. R. Co.14 defendants operated
cars over different routes which crossed at right angles at which
point two trolleys, one operated by each company, collided, injuring
plaintiff, a passenger on the Eighth Ave. line. Besides herself only
one other witness, her husband, testified in plaintiff's behalf, and
such testimony was limited to a mere statement of the accident.
Compared with the previous case this one was palpably weak yet the
Court of Appeals expressed its satisfaction with respect to the opinion
of the trial court that a presumption was created.15
"We agree with the learned trial court below that the
details of the collision, meagre as they were, required sub-
mission to the jury of the issue of negligence as to each de-
fendant, and that a nonsuit would have been improper. * * *
While the occurrence of the accident called for an explana-
tion 'by the defendant, the trial court erred in charging, as a
matter of law, that no explanation had been furnished. Even
though the accident created a presumption of negligence if
there was any evidence to rebut the presumption, the burden
of proof rested on the plaintiff and if on the whole case the
conclusion of negligence or absence of negligence could be
drawn with equal fairness that burden was not discharged."
'2 Supra Note 9.
3 Ibid. 192.
"1 162 N. Y. 380, 56 N. E. 988 (1900).
5 Ilbid. 384 (Italics ours).
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The jury would be justified in finding that even with the aid of
the presumption the evidence did not preponderate in plaintiff's
favor 16 but they could not ignore its existence.17
The import of the rule is still further obscured by the holding in
Hogan v. Manhattan Railway Co.' s Plaintiff driving a coal cart
under an elevated railway received a severe wound from an iron bar
which fell from the structure overhead where a gang of men were at
work. At the close of plaintiff's evidence cross motions were made
for a directed verdict with the result that plaintiff's was granted, the
amount of damages being left to the jury for determination. Here
was a finding that not only was there a presumption but one of force
sufficient to merit the Court of Appeals affirmance of a directed
verdict. judge Bartlett said: 19
"We think the case was properly disposed of at the trial
for the reason that the undisputed evidence raised a presump-
tion of negligence against the defendant. The plaintiff sus-
tained the burden of proof and it was incumbent upon the
defendant to offer evidence if any existed to rebut the pre-
sumption of negligence."
Finally we have the case of Sandier v. Garrison 20 decided in
November, 1928. Plaintiff, while standing upon a sidewalk was
struck by an iron door lock which fell from defendant's elevated
road while a train was passing. The object was seen while falling
through the air but whether it came from the structure or the train
itself, plaintiff's witnesses were unable to testify. This coupled with
the statement of the injury and circumstances surrounding it, com-
prised plaintiff's evidence. An employee of defendant testified
respecting the similarity of the exhibit to locks used upon its cars
and that an examination of the cars contained in the train which was
had soon after the accident disclosed the fact that a lock had been
torn from its fastenings on one of the cab doors. Further evidence
was adduced describing the construction of the cab, its position
within 'the body of the car and the height of the window therein.
The purpose of this was to show that a higher position was occupied
by the window than by the door lock when in place and that by
reason thereof it was impossible for it if it became dislodged to fall
through the window. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and
although the judgment was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate
Division,21 the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and dis-
missed the complaint.
" Kay v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., 163 N. Y. 447, 57 N. E. 751 (1900).
' Heckel & Harper, op. cit. supra Note 5 at 730 N. 47.
149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E. 403 (1896).
"Ibid. 25.
249 N. Y. 236 (1928).
21223 App. Div. 738 (2nd Dept. 1928).
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Judge Kellogg based the opinion of the Court upon the ground
that plaintiff failed to prove ownership or control and that possession
by a passenger, who accidentally or purposely dropped the lock, was
a hypothesis at least equal in probability to the theory that it was
under defendant's supervision.22
"The lock, which had been torn from the door, had
occupied a position nearly two feet lower than the window
opening of the cab. If through the negligence of the de-
fendant, the fastenings of the lock had become insecure and
the lock had fallen, nevertheless it could not have fallen on
the plaintiff to cause the injuries of which she complains. The
very evidence, therefore, which furnished proof that the
defendants at one time possessed and controlled the lock,
negatived every possible inference that wegligence on the
part of the defendant was the proximate cause of the accident.'
Conceding that plaintiff's case is weak, we find it hard to agree
with its final disposition. The argument that voids every possible
inference of defendant's negligence is unconvincing. While it is
true that mere injury or accident alone does not justify application
of the maxim 2 3 the circumstances in this case were of such character
that negligence was deducible therefrom without further proof.
2 4
Plaintiff is not required to present a case of an impregnable nature.
The conclusion of defendant's negligence need not be inescapable, but
only inferable therefrom.2 5 The very reason for the rule is founded
upon plaintiff's inability to do more than state the occurrence. 26
Usually the chief evidence of the accident is practically accessible to
the defendant but inaccessible to the person injured.27  That exclu-
sive control of the instrumentality causing the injury is essential
cannot be disputed,28 and it is upon this point that plaintiff's case is
=Supra Note 20 at 239 (Pound, Crane and Andrews, .J., dissented).
(Italics ours.)
=Curtis v. Rochester & S. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 534 (1859); Feingold v.
Ocean S. S. Co. of Savannah, Ga., 113 N. Y. Supp. 1018, 61 Misc. 638 (1909).
t 2 Shearman & Redfield, Negligence (4th Ed.), Sec. 59: "Where it is shown
that the accident is such that its real cause may be the negligence of the
defendant, and that whether it is so or not is within the knowledge of the
defendant, the plaintiff may give the required evidence of negligence, without
himself explaining the real cause of the accident, by proving the circumstances,
and thus raising a presumption that, if the defendant does not choose to give
the explanation, the real cause was negligence on the part of the defendant."
'Plumb v. Richmond Light & P. Co., 187 N. Y. Supp. 38, 195 App. Div.
254 (2nd Dept.), aff'd 233 N. Y. 285; 135 N. E. 504 (1922).
'Ross v. Cotton Mills, 140 N. C. 115, 52 S. E. 121 (1905).
=Ibid. 140 N. C. at 122; 52 S. E. at 124.
T Slater v. Barnes, 241 N. Y. 284, 149 N. E. 859 (1925).
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noticeably weak.29  But that question was, upon conflicting evidence,
submitted to the jury and resolved in plaintiff's favor.
In the dosing lines of its opinion the Court speaks of "proximate
cause." 30 Inquiry into that point would involve a discussion so far
beyond the contemplation of this note that we cannot now do more
than simply refer to it. Proceeding upon any theory other than that
which assumes "possession" by a passenger would not defendant
still be liable? 31 As already stated it is neither necessary nor
expedient for us to answer that question at this time for it is merely
tangent to the issue.
We find then, upon a summation of our cases, four different
holdings, starting with an inference which is gradually extended into
a presumption of considerable force and ending with a complete
denial of the application of the doctrine. From these, assuming that
they are fairly indicative of judicial opinion in this state, we are to
draw our conclusions. We feel that the rule relates merely to the
probative force of evidence, 32 and, like all circumstantial evidence,
owes its efficacy to the probability that acts flow from their usual
and natural causes. It attains, in some cases, the height of a pre-
sumption, and always, where the rule is applicable, entitles the
plaintiff to go to the jury on the question of negligence.3 3  But is it
really necessary to determine the grade of presumption or whether
one exists at all? Is it not more important to decide whether "the
thing really speaks for itself," affording "reasonable evidence" of
defendant's negligence? May we venture to suggest that the latter
proposition is representative of the majority opinion and more nearly
consonant with the progressive attitude of the New York Court of
Appeals, than any other example given herein?
J.A.M.
'Richardson, Evidence (2nd Ed. 1923) Sec. 86 ("But if the injury can
be accounted for on any reasonable theory other than that of the defendant's
negligence, or if the responsibility for the injury may lie with one of two or
more parties so that it is not clear from the mere happening of the accident
whose negligence caused it, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not be applied..
Robinson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 194 N. Y. 37, 86 N. E. 805; Wolf v. Am.
Tract Society, 164 N. Y. 30, 58 N. E. 31; Haidie v. Boland Co., 205 N. Y. 336,
98 N. E. 661; Francey v. Rutland R. R. Co., 222 N. Y. 482, 119 N. E. 86").
' Supra Note 20 at 240.
'McLaughlin, Proximate Cause (1925) 39 Harv. Law Rev. 149; 6 Words
& Phrases (3rd Series) 315 ("The test of proximate cause is whether the facts
constitute a continuous succession of events so linked together that they become
a natural whole, or whether the chain of events is so broken that they become
independent and the final result is not the natural and probable consequence of
the primary cause. It is not 'the sole cause,' but 'a direct and concurring cause
and one but for which the result would not have occurred. * * *").
Here, it might well be contended, that the proximate cause of injury was
defendant's negligence, in allowing the lock to become unfastened and that it
was the probable cause that set in motion other causes, thus producing inquiry.
' Atkinson v. United Railroads of San Francisco, 71 Cal. App. 82, 234
P. 863 (1925).
Myers v. City of Independence, 189 S. W. 816 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1916).
